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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-742
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
742
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-701
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-743
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
743
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ 3 C ] [ ] C
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-702
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-744
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
744
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-703
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-745
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
745
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-704
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-746
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 746
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-705
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-747
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 747
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C 3 C 3 C 3 [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-706
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-748
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
748
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-707
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-749
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 749
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-708
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-750
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
750
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-709
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-751
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
751
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-710
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-752
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
752
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] C
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-711
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-753
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 753
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-712
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-754
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
754
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-713
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-755
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
755
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-714
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-756
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
756
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYMAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-715
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-757
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
757
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-716
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-758
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
758
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-717
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-759
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
759
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THE REMOVAL OF "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-718
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-760
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 760
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-719
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-761
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 761
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-720
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-762
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
762
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-721
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-763
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
763
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-722
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-764
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
764
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-723
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-765
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
765
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-724
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-766
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
766
RESISTCR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-725
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-767
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
767
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-726
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-768
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
768
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-727
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-769
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
769
RESISTOR, 5. IK i/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-728
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-770
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
770
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-729
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-771
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
771
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-730
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-772
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
772
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-731
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-773
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
773
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-732
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-774
FRCS
774
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-733
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-775
FRCS
775
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-734
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-776
FRCS
776
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-735
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-777
FRCS
777
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] C ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-736
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-778
FRCS
778
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-737
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
FRCS-779
FRCS
779
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-738
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-780
FRCS
780
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-739
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-781
FRCS
781
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C 3 [ ]
[ 3 [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-740
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-782
FRCS
782
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C 1
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-741
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-783
FRCS
783
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-742
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-784
FRCS
784
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-743
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-785
FRCS
785
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-744
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-786
FRCS
786
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-745
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-787
FRCS
787
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-746
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
FRCS-788 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 788
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-747
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
FRCS-789 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 789
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-748
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-790
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
790
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD I, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-749
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-791
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
791
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD i, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-750
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-792
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
792
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD I, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-751
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-793
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
793
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD I, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-752
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-794
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
794
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD i, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-753
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-795
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
795
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD I, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-754
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-796
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
796
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD i, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-755
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-797
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
797
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 1, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-756
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-798
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
798
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CN] CN] CN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD i, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 30 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II095X-II099X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-757
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-799
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
799
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] C ]
] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-IIIO4X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-758
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-800
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
800
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-759
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-801
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
801
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-760
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-802
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
802
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-761
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-803
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
803
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-762
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-804
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
804
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-763
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-805
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
805
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-764
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-806
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
806
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-III04X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-765
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-807
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
807
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 2, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 31 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III00X-IIIO4X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-766
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-808
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
808
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-767
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-809
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
809
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] CP]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IlI05X-III09X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-768
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-810
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
810
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II105X-III09X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-769
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-811
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
811
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-770
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-812
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
812
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-771
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-813
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
813
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-772
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-814
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
814
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-773
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-815
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
815
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-774
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-816
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
816
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 3, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III05X-III09X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-775
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-817
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
817
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIIIOX-IIII4X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-776
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-818
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
818
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII0X-IIII4X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-777
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-819
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
819
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[p] [p] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII0X-IIII4X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-778
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-820
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
820
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[N] IN] [N]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIIIOX-IIII4X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-779
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-821
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
821
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII0X-IIII4X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-780
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-822
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
822
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII0X-IIII4X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-781
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-823
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
823
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII0X-IIII4X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-782
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-824
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
824
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IlII0X-IIII4X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-783
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-825
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
825
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH 33 RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII0X-IIII4X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-784
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS- 826
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
826
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-785
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-827
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
827
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-786
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-828
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
828
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-787
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-829
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
829
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-788
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-830
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
830
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-789
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-831
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C ]
FRCS
831
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-790
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-832
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
832
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-791
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-833
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
FRCS
833
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-792
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-834
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
834
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] IN]
C
[ ]
[p]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-793
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-835
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
835
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-794
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-836
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
836
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIO01X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-795
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
9, i0
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-837
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
837
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-796
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
9, I0
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-838
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
838
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-797
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS ii, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-839
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
839
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-798
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS Ii, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-840
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
840
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-799
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS-841
03-2F-I03350 -2
FRCS
841
FU TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-800
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-842
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
842
FU TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-801
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-843
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
843
FU TK OUT PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CP] [P] Cp]
[ ] [ ] C ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-802
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-844
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
844
FU TK OUT PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-803
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-845
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
845
OX TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-804
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-846
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
846
OX TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-805
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-847
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
847
OX TK OUT PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-806
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-848
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
848
OX TK OUT PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-807
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-849
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
849
FU PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
CP] CP]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE C /N ] C N ] C N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-808
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-850
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
850
FU PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-809
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-851
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
851
FU FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA
IOA
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
[3/3 ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-810
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-852
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
852
FU FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-811
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-853
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
853
L FUEL PRESS LINE BACKUP TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] C P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-812
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-854
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
854
L FUEL PRESS LINE BACKUP TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-813
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-855
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
855
OX FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-814
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-856
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
856
OX FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-815
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-857
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
857
OX PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-816
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-858
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
858
OX PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-817
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-859
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
859
OX PRESS LINE TEMP BACKUP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-818
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-860
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
860
OX PRESS LINE TEMP BACKUP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[p]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-819
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-861
03-2F-I03370 -i
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS
861
OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [p]
C ] C ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: IOA SHOULD HAVE ANALYZED FUEL
TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR ALSO CONTAINED IN THIS FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-820
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-862
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03370 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
862
OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: IOA SHOULD HAVE ANALYZED FUEL
TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR ALSO CONTAINED IN THIS FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-821
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-863
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
863
FU MANIF PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-822
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-864
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
864
FU MANIF PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] C P ] C P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-823
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-865
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
865
OX MANIF PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-824
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-866
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
866
OX MANIF PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-825
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-867
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
867
FU MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[p] [P] [p]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-826
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-868
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
868
FU MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
C ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-827
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-869
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
869
OX MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-828
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-870
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
870
OX MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-829
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-871
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
871
FU MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
CP] [P]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-830
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-872
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
872
FU MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_NC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-831
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS-873
03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
873
OX MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
D. HARTMAN
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-832
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-874
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
874
OX MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-833
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-875
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
875
FU MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-834
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-876
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
876
FU MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-835
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-877
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
877
OX MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-836
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-878
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
878
OX MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-837
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS-879
05-6KF-2153 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
879
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH TALKBACK
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-838
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-879A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2154 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
879
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-839
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-880
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
880
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-840
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-880A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
880
MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-841
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-881
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
881
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-842
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-881A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
881
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-843
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-882
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
882
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-844
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-882A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
882
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-845
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-883
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
883
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-846
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-883A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
FRCS
883
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-847
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-884
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
884
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
C N ] C N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-848
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-885
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
885
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-849
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-886
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
886
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-850
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-887
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
887
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-851
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-888
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
888
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-852
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-889
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
889
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-853
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-890
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
890
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-854
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-891
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
891
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-855
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-892
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
892
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-856
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-893
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
893
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-857
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-894
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
894
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-858
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-895
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
895
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-859
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-896
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
896
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-860
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-897
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2181 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
897
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
C P ]
C P ]
C ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-861
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-898
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2181 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
898
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-862
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-899
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2182 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
899
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-863
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-900
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2182 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
900
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED (MULTIPLE
FAILURES) WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-864
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-901
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
901
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-865
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-902
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
902
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-866
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-903
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
903
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-867
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-904
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
904
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-868
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-905
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2183 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
905
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-869
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-906
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2183 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
906
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-870
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-907
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2183 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
907
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-871
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-908
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2183 -2
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
908
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-872
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-909
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 909
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-873
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-910
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 910
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-874
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-911
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 911
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-912
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 912
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-876
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-913
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 913
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3 JETS.
JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-877
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-914
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 914
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-915
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 915
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-879
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
FRCS-916
05-6KF-2260 -2
FRCS
916
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
[ ]
C ]
[ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-880
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-917
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 917
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
OIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-881
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-918
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 918
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-919
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 919
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-883
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-920
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 920
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-921
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 921
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-885
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-922
05-6KF-2260 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 922
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
ClL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-923
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 923
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-887
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-924
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 924
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-888
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-925
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 925
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-889
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-926
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 926
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-927
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 927
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-891
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-928
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 928
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDWIFUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[p] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-892
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-929
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 929
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-893
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-930
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 930
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-894
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-931
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 931
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-895
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-932
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 932
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-933
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 933
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-934
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 934
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-935
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 935
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] "[ F ] [ P ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-899
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-936
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 936
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-900
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-937
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2271 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 937
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] IF]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-901
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-938
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2271 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 938
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-902
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-939
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 939
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
ix]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-903
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-940
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 940
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-904
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-941
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 941
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
RE_:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4 AND 5.
PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2.
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REDUNDANCY FOR MANIFOLD 4 JETS
JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-905
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-942
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 942
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-906
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-943
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 943
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-907
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-944
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 944
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-908
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-945
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2270 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 945
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-909
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-946
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2270 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 946
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-910
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-947
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 947
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-911
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-948
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 948
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-912
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-949
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 949
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-913
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-950
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 950
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-914
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-951
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 951
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-915
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-952
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 952
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-916
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-953
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 953
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-917
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-954
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 954
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CN] [N] CN]
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-918
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-955
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 955
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-919
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-956
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
SUBSYSTEM: . FRCS
MDAC ID: 956
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-920
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-957
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2220 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 957
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-921
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-958
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2220 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 958
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-922
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-959
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 959
ITEM: FUSE, 2A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-923
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-960
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 960
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE ISSUE FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-924
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-961
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 961
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-925
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-962
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 962
ITEM: FUSE, 2A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-926
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-963
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 963
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE ISSUE FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-927
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-964
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 964
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-928
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-965
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 965
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-929
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-966
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 966
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
i. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE ISSUE FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-930
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-967
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 967
ITEM: FUSE, IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
I. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-931
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-968
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2017 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 968
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
] IX]*
] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-932
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-969
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 969
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-933
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-970
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 970
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE ISSUE FOR FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-934
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-971
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2017 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 971
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-935
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-972
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 972
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-936
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-973
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 973
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-937
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-974
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 974
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS OF MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-938
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-975
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 975
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-939
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-976
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 976
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-940
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-977
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 977
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-941
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-978
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
978
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-942
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-979
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
979
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-943
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-980
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
980
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-944
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-981
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
981
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-945
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-982
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
982
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D° HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /9 ] [ ] [ J [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-946
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-983
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
983
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-947
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-984
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
984
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-948
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-985
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
985
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-949
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-986
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
986
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-950
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-987
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
987
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-951
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-988
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 988
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-952
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-989
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 989
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-953
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-990
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
990
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-954
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-991
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
991
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOARECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-955
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-992
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
992
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-956
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-993
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
993
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-957
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-994
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
994
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-958
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-995
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
995
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-959
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-996
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
996
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-960
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-997
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
997
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-961
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-998
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -I
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
998
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-962
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-999
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
999
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-963
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-1000
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: i000
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-964
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1001
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: i001
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-965
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1002
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
1002
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-966
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1003
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM •
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1003
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-967
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1004
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1004
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMA_ :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-968
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1005
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1005
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-969
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1006
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1006
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-970
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1007
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1007
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-971
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1008
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1008
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-972
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1009
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1009
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-973
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1010
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
I010
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-974
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1011
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2095 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
i011
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-975
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1012
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1012
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-976
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1013
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1013
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-977
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1014
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
1014
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] *
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-978
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1015
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1015
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-979
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1016
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -1
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1016
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-980
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1017
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1017
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-981
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1018
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1018
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-982
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1019
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1019
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-983
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1020
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1020
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-984
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1021
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1021
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-985
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1022
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1022
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
E ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-986
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-I023
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1023
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-987
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1024
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1024
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-988
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1025
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1025
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-989
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1026
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1026
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-990
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1027
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
i027
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOARECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-991
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1028
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1028
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-992
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1029
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1029
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-993
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1030
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1030
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-994
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1031
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1031
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-995
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1032
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1032
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-996
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1033
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1033
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-997
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1034
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2111 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1034
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-998
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1035
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1035
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RLR42 TYPE RESISTORS HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO RWR80 TYPE RESISTORS
WHICH CAN SHORT. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
NOTE: OPEN FAILURE MODE FOR THIS RESISTOR ON THE 05-6KF-2111-I
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING.
TO BE CREATED.
SHORT FAILURE MODE FOR THIS RESISTOR
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-999
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1036
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1036
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1000
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1037
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2094 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1037
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1001
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1038
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1038
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I002
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1039
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2096 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1039
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I003
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1040
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1040
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I004
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1041
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1041
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1005
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1042
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1042
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I006
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1043
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2097 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1043
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I007
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1044
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1044
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I008
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-I045
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2093 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1045
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I009
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1046
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1046
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1010
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1047
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1047
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1011
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1048
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1048
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I012
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1049
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2098 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1049
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I013
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-I050
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2109 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1050
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1014
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1051
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2109 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1051
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I015
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1052
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2110 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1052
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I016
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1053
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2110 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1053
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i017
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1054
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2109 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1054
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1018
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1055
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2109 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1055
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I019
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1056
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2110 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1056
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I020
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1057
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2110 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1057
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i021
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1058
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1058
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I022
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1059
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1059
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I023
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1060
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1060
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I024
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-I061
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1061
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS I,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i025
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1062
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1062
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1026
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1063
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1063
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I027
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1064
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1064
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I028
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1065
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1065
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1029
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1066
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1066
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] CN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1030
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1067
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1067
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III20X-III24X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I031
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1068
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1068
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] CP] [P]
C N ] C N ] C N ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII5X-IIII9X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I032
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1069
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1069
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII5X-IIII9X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I033
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1070
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1070
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII5X-IIII9X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1034
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1071
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1071
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII5X-IIII9X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I035
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1072
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1072
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII5X-IIII9X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i036
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1073
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
1073
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] C ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS IIII5X-IIII9X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I037
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1074
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1074
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I038
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1075
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1075
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I039
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1076
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1076
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] [N] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I040
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1077
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1077
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I041
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1078
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1078
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I042
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1079
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1079
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I043
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1080
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1080
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1044
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-1081
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
6
FRCS
1081
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I045
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1082
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1082
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III30X-III34X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I046
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1083
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [
FRCS
1083
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II130X-III34X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I047
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1084
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1084
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III25X-III29X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I048
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1085
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1085
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III25X-III29X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I049
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1086
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1086
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III25X-III29X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I050
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1087
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1087
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III25X-III29X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I051
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1088
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1088
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III25X-III29X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i052
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-1089
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
FRCS
1089
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 7 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III25X-III29X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I053
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1090
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1090
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
C N ] [ N ] C N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I054
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
FRCS-1091 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1091
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I055
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1092
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1092
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I056
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1093
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1093
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1057
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1094
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1094
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1058
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1095
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1095
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I059
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1096
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1096
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ S ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I060
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1097
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1097
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I061
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1098
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1098
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
CP] CP] CP]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I062
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1099
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1099
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III40X-III44X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i063
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II00
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
Ii00
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III35X-III39X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I064
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [
FRCS
ii01
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III35X-III39X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1065
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-I102
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1102
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III35X-III39X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I066
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II03
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1103
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III35X-III39X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I067
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II04
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1104
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III35X-III39X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1068
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II05
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1105
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III35X-III39X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I069
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II06
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1106
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] C P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I070
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II07
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1107
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I071
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II08
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1108
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I072
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM"
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
I, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II09
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1109
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i073
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-III0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
Iii0
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I074
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-IIII
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
iiii
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1075
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-III2
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1112
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [p] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I076
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-III3
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1113
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 1 [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I077
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-III4
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1114
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I078
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-III5
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
ii15
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III50X-III54X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i079
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-III6
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1116
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT
IDs FRCS III45X-III49X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1080
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-III7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1117
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT
IDs FRCS III45X-III49X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i081
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
I, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-III8
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS
1118
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] CP]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT
IDs FRCS III45X-III49X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1082
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-III9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [
FRCS
1119
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT
IDs FRCS III45X-IlI49X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I083
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II20
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1120
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT
IDs FRCS III45X-III49X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I084
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II21
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1121
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT
IDs FRCS 11145X-III49X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I085
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1122
RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i086
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II23
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1123
RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I087
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II24
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1124
RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I088
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-II25
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1125
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CONTACTS i, 2 OR 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/2R] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [
[ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I089
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II26
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1126
RJDF2B L5/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1090
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II27
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1127
RJDF2B LS/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1091
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II28
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] C
IOA C 2 /2 ] [
FRCS
1128
RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I092
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-II29
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1129
RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I093
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-II30
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1130
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS 3, 4 OR 7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59Xo
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1094
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-II31
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1131
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS 3, 4 OR 7, 8
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III55X-III59X.
SEE
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1095
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II32
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1132
RJDFIB MANIFOLD F1 TRICKLE TEST
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A AND B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i096
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1133
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1133
RJDFIAMANIFOLD F2 TRICKLE TEST
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A AND B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I097
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II34
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1134
RJDF2AMANIFOLD F3 TRICKLE TEST
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A AND B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i098
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II35
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1135
RJDF2B MANIFOLD F4, F5 TRICKLE TEST
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A AND B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I099
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II36
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F3D, F2D, F4D
FRCS
1136
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-IIO0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II37
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F3D, F2D, F4D
FRCS
1137
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-ll01
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II38
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F2F, F3F
FRCS
1138
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF,
LEAD ANALYST" D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1102
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-1139
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F2F, F3F
FRCS
1139
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-ii03
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II40
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F3L, F2R, F4R
FRCS
1140
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-ii04
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II41
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F3L, F2R, F4R
FRCS
1141
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-II05
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II42
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F2U, F3U
FRCS
1142
CHAMBERPRESSURE(Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERSFIU,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-II06
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II43
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121314 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F2U, F3U
FRCS
1143
CHAMBER PRESSURE (PC) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIU,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1107
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II44
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1144
CHAMBER PRESSURE (PC) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L, F5R
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VERNIER THRUSTERS CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121314-2 FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE SENSORS WERE PART OF THE
VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE
FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-II08
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II45
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1145
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L, F5R
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VERNIER THRUSTERS CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121314-I FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE SENSORS WERE PART OF THE
VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE
FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-II09
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II46
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F2D, F3D, F4D
FRCS
1146
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1110
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II47
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F2D, F3D, F4D
FRCS
1147
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE C /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-Ill1
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II48
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F2F, F3F
FRCS
1148
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1112
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II49
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F2F, F3F
FRCS
1149
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-II13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II50
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F3L, F2R, F4R
FRCS
1150
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-II14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II51
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F3L, F2R, F4R
FRCS
1151
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1115
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II52
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F2U, F3U
FRCS
1152
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIU,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1116
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II53
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121315 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F2U, F3U
FRCS
1153
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIU,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-II17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II54
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F5R
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS
1154
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L,
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C p ] [ P ] C p ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
VERNIER THRUSTERS INJECTOR TEMPERATURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121315-2 FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE SENSORS WERE PART OF THE
VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE
FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1118
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II55
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F5R
FRCS
1155
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VERNIER THRUSTERS INJECTOR TEMPERATURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121315-I FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE SENSORS WERE PART OF THE
VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE
FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-II19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II56
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1156
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i120
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II57
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1157
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I121
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II58
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1158
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I122
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II59
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1159
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] C P ] C P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I123
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II60
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1160
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
RE}_:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1124
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II61
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1161
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I125
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II62
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1162
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II63
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: i163
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II64
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1164
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II65
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1165
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
112o/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I129
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II66
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1166
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II67
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1167
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1131
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II68
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1168
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RY__:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II69
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1169
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o188.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II70
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1170
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II71
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1171
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II72
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1172
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [3168H] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II73
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1173
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II74
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1174
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II75
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1175
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INABILITY&aI2Y._RWOHEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o188.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II76
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1176
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II77
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1177
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPAE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I141
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II78
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1178
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II79
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2215 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1179
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INABILITY TO TURN HEATER OFF MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO ORBITER POINTING DEEP SPACE FOR COOLING.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II80
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1180
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IISI
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1181
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II82
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1182
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II83
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1183
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II84
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1184
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
3
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II85
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1185
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II86
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1186
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II87
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2013 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1187
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II88
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2012 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1188
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK SHOWS 3
AMP FUSES BUT SCHEMATIC VS70-942099 SHOWS 1 AMP FUSES.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1152
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II89
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2012 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1189
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK SHOWS 3
AMP FUSES BUT SCHEMATIC VS70-942099 SHOWS 1 AMP FUSES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II90
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2012 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1190
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK SHOWS 3
AMP FUSES BUT SCHEMATIC VS70-942099 SHOWS 1 AMP FUSES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II91
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2012 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: ll91
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK SHOWS 3
AMP FUSES BUT SCHEMATIC VS70-942099 SHOWS 1 AMP FUSES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II92
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2011 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1192
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [P] [p]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II93
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2011 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1193
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[2/2 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II94
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2011 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1194
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [p] [p]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II95
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2011A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1195
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: THE 7.5 AMP FUSE LISTED ABOVE IS
INCORRECT. IT SHOULD BE A 5 AMP FUSE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II96
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2010 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1196
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. NOTE: THE 7.5 AMP FUSE LISTED ABOVE IS
INCORRECT. IT SHOULD BE A 5 AMP FUSE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II97
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1197
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 3
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II98
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1198
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 3
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II99
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1199
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 1
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1200
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1200
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 1
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1201
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1201
HEATER 90W, A & B OX FWD HTR PNL 4
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1202
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1202
HEATER 90W, A & BOX FWD HTR PNL 4
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1203
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1203
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 2
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1204
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1204
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 2
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1205
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1205
HEATER 90W, A & B FU FWD HTR PNL 5
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1206
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1206
HEATER 90W, A & B FU FWD HTR PNL 5
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1207
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1207
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 6
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1208
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03340 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1208
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 6
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1209
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1209
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, -X AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1210
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1210
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, -X AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[
(If different from NASA)
/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1211
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
1211
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1212
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1212
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/1R] [p]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1213
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1213
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1177
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1214
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121316 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1214
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I178
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1215
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121317 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1215
HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I179
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1216
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121317 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1216
HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1180
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1217
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2131 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1217
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I181
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1218
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2131 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1218
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
C ]
CP]
CN]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i182
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1219
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2131 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1219
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1183
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1220
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2131 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1220
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA
IOA
A
[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [p]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
B
[ ]
[p]
IN]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I184
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1221
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1221
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I185
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1222
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1222
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1186
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1223
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1223
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS -
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I187
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-1224
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1224
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I188
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1225
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2100 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1225
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1189
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1226
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2100 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1226
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I190
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1227
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1227
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO NASA FMEA FOR THIS RESISTOR. CIRCUIT IS NOT WIRED ON OTHER
SIDE OF RESISTOR.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I191
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1228
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1228
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO NASA FMEA FOR THIS RESISTOR. CIRCUIT IS NOT WIRED ON OTHER
SIDE OF RESISTOR.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I192
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1229
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1229
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO NASA FMEA FOR THIS RESISTOR. CIRCUIT IS NOT WIRED ON OTHER
SIDE OF RESISTOR.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I193
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1230
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1230
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO NASA FMEA FOR THIS RESISTOR. CIRCUIT IS NOT WIRED ON OTHER
SIDE OF RESISTOR.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1194
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1231
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1231
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i195
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1232
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1232
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1196
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1233
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2100 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1233
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I197
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1234
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2100 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1234
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I198
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1235
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1235
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-I199
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1236
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2101 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1236
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1200
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1237
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1237
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOa [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ 1
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1201
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1238
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1238
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1202
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1239
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1239
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1203
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1240
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1240
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1204
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1241
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
FRCS
1241
RESISTOR, 5. IK I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1205
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1242
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1242
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
1
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1206
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1243
NASA FMEA # : 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1243
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1207
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1244
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1244
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1208
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1245
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1245
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1209
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1246
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2099 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1246
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1210
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1247
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1247
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[p] [p] [p]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RCS/OMS FORWARD HEATER SWITCH $3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III85X-III89X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1211
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1248
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1248
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RCS/OMS FORWARD HEATER SWITCH $3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III85X-III89X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1212
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-1249
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1249
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C ] [ ]
[P] [P]
C N ] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RCS/OMS FORWARD HEATER SWITCH $3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS III85X-III89X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1213
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1250
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1250
MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD i JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-III64X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1214
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1251
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1251
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs II160X-III64X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1215
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1252
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1252
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-II164X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1216
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1253
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1253
MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] C P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-III64X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1217
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1254
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1254
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-III64X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1218
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1255
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1255
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-III64X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1219
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
/N
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1256
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1256
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET I
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-III64X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1220
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1257
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1257
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 1
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III60X-III64X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1221
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1258
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1258
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1222
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1259
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1259
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1223
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1260
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1260
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1224
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1261
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1261
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1225
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1262
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1262
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1226
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-1263
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FRCS
1263
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1227
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1264
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1264
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CN] CN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1228
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1265
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1265
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 2
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III65X-III69X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1229
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1266
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1266
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
CN] CN] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-I1174X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1230
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1267
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1267
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CILCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-llI74X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1231
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1268
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1268
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-III74X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1232
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1269
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1269
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-III74X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1233
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1270
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1270
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-III74X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1234
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1271
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
FRCS
1271
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs IIITOX-III74X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1235
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1272
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1272
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 3
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-III74X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1236
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1273
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1273
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 3
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 3 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III70X-III74X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1237
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE :
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1274
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1274
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] C P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-II179X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1238
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-1275
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1275
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-III79X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1239
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1276
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1276
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-III79X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1240
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1277
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1277
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-III79X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1241
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1278
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1278
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs llI75X-III79X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1242
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-1279
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FRCS
1279
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-III79X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1243
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1280
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1280
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 4
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[P] CP] [P]
CN] CN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-III79X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1244
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YS TEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1281
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1281
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 4
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III75X-III79X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1245
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1282
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
1282
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] [N] CN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III80X-III84X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1246
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-1283
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1283
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs IIIS0X-III84X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1247
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-1284
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
FRCS
1284
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III80X-III84X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1248
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1285
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1285
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III80X-III84X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1249
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1286
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1286
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs IIIBOX-III84X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1250
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1287
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1287
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III80X-III84X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1251
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1288
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1288
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 5
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III80X-III84X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1252
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-1289
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1289
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 5
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18 RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs III80X-III84X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1253
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1290
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1290
FU SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1254
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1291
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1291
FU SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1255
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1292
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1292
OX SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1256
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1293
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1293
OX SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1257
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1294
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121345 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1294
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, - X AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1258
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1295
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1295
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, - X AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ F ]
[N]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1259
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1296
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1296
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1260
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1297
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1297
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1261
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1298
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103345 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1298
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1262
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1299
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1299
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1263
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1300
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1300
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. NOTE:
VERNIER THRUSTERS THERMAL SWITCH NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED ON
THIS FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1264
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1301
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1301
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 2/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
VERNIER THRUSTERS THERMAL SWITCH NOT ADDRESSED.
[ ]
[ ]
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE VERNIER THERMAL SWITCH WAS PART
OF THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY AND DID NOT REQUIRE A SEPARATE
FMEA. FOR CONSISTENCY WITH THE PRIMARY THRUSTERS, IOA RECOMMENDS
A FMEA BE CREATED TO COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1265
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II001X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2006-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: ii001
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1266
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II002X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2006-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11002
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1267
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II003X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11003
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCHED FAILED OPEN CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1268
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II004X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11004
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCHED FAILED OPEN CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1269
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II005X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11005
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1270
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II006X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
[
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11006
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCHED FAILED OPEN CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1271
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II007X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
11007
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1272
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II008X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: ii008
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1273
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II009X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2090-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11009
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
E ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1274
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II010X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2092-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
ii010
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1275
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II011X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2092-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
ii011
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1276
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II012X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11012
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1277
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II013X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11013
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OFTHE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1278
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II014X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
ii014
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1279
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II015X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2091-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11015
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1280
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS-II016X
05-6KF-2156-2
FRCS
11016
EVENT INDICATOR
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1281
J
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II017X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2156-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11017
ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1282
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II018X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2177-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11018
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER
LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1283
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IIOI9X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2177-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11019
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1284
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II020X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2178-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11020
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE TO
PERFORM MISSION OPERATIONS
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1285
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II021X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2178-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11021
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1286
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II022X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: i1022
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1287
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II023X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11023
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1288
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II024X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11024
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS
OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1289
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II025X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11025
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS FOR MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1290
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II026X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2213-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: ii026
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1291
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II027X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2213-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11027
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1292
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II028X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2212-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11028
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1293
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II029X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2212-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11029
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER FAILED HIGH
CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS CAUSES LOSS
OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1294
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II030X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2211-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11030
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE FOR VERNIERS,
THUS CAUSING LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1295
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II031X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2211-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11031
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P J [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1296
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II032X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2113A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11032
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1297
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11033X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2113A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11033
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1298
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11034X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2224-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11034
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES HE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1299
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II035X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2224-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11035
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1300
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II036X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11036
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1301
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II037X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11037
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1302
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II038X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11038
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1303
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II039X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11039
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1304
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II044X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11044
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1305
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II045X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257D-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11045
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1306
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II046X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11046
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE WITH THE GPC. MANUAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1307
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II047X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257E-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11047
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1308
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II048X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11048
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
B
[ P ]
[ NA]
[N]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1309
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II049X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257B-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11049
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1310
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II050X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11050
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1311
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II051X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257C-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11051
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1312
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II052X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11052
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1313
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II053X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11053
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1314
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11054X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11054
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1315
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II055X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11055
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1316
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II056X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2269-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11056
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1317
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-I1057X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2269-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11057
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1318
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II058X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2269-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11058
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1319
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II059X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2269-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11059
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1320
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II060X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11060
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE WITH MANUALLY. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1321
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II061X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11061
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1322
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II062X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11062
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE WITH THE GPC. MANUAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1323
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II063X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11063
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1324
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II064X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11064
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
CAUSES INABILITY TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OPEN
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1325
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS-II065X
05-6KF-2257F-2
FRCS
11065
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[p]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1326
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11066X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257G-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11066
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE WITH THE GPC. MANUAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1327
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-II067X
05-6KF-2257G-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11067
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II068X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257H-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11068
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II069X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257H-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11069
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II070X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2258-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11070
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE,
CAUSING LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II071X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2258-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11071
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-II072X
NONE
FRCS
11072
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1333
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II073X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11073
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-II074X
NONE
FRCS
11074
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
FRCS-IIO75X BASELINE [ ]
NONE NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11075
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
D. HARTMAN
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C3/3 ] [ ] C ] C ] C 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1336
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II076X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2280-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11076
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II077X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2280-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11077
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1338
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-I1078X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11078
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
C ] C ] *
[P] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]2880H[N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ]
[P]
IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCH NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE MANIFOLD
5 ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS
THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1339
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II079X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11079
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCH NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1340
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II080X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11080
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1341
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II081X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11081
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH VALVE CLOSED, A SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS PREVENTS FURTHER
VALVE MOVEMENT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED CLOSED
HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II082X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11082
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
WITH VALVE CLOSED, A SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS PREVENTS FURTHER
VALVE MOVEMENT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED CLOSED
HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II083X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
11083
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II084X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11084
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /iR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11085X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2028-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11085
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II086X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11086
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RYe:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II087X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11087
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II088X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11088
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1349
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II089X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2028-I
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUN C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
11089
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1350
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-I1090X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2029-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11090
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1351
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II091X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11091
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1352
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II092X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11092
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1353
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-I1093X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2029-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
11093
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] C P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1354
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II094X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2029-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
11094
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] C p ]
[P] [P]
C ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1355
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II095X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID-
ITEM:
FRCS
11095
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1356
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II096X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11096
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO
MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED CLOSED
HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1357
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II097X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11097
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO
MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR A FAILED CLOSED
HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1358
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II098X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11098
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1359
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
FRCS-II099X
05-6KF-2030-I
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
11099
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1360
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III00X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
iii00
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1361
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III01X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11101
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1362
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III02X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11102
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1363
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III03X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11103
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1364
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III04X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11104
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
r
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1365
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-III05X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
FRCS
Ii105
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1366
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III06X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11106
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 3 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1367
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III07X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11107
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 3 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1368
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III08X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11108
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1369
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III09X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11109
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1370
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IIIIOX
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
iiii0
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1371
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-IIIIIX
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
iiiii
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 4 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1372
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IIII2X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
llll2
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 4 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1373
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IIII3X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11113
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1374
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IIII4X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11114
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1375
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IIII5X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11115
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTER.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1376
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IIII6X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11116
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
C ]
C ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1377
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III17X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
Iil17
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] C P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
C ]
C ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1378
_J
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III18X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11118
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1379
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IIII9X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11119
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[p] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTER.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1380
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III20X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11120
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1381
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III21X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11121
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1382
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III22X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11122
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1383
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III23X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11123
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1384
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III24X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11124
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1385
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III25X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
ii125
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTER.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1386
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III26X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11126
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ a/3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
[ 3
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1387
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III27X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11127
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
[ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1388
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III28X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11128
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
[ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1389
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III29X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID"
ITEM:
FRCS
11129
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTER.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1390
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III30X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11130
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1391
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III31X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11131
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[P] [P] [Pi
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] ,[ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1392
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III32X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11132
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1393
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III33X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11133
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1394
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III34X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11134
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1395
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III35X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11135
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTER.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1396
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III36X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11136
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
[ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1397
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II137X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11137
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
[ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1398
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III38X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
ii138
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
C ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1399
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III39X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11139
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 5
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTER.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1400


